Optional Contracts for Central Banker and Public Debt Policy by Fujiki, Hiroshi et al.
Title Optional Contracts for Central Banker and Public Debt Policy
Author(s)Fujiki, Hiroshi; Osano, Hiroshi; Uchida, Hirofumi







*Any views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent
any of the institutions.
Optimal Contracts for Central Banker
and Public Debt Policy*
Hiroshi FUJIKI
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research,
Kyoto University
Hiroshi OSANO







Correspondence to: Hiroshi OSANO, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University,
Sakyo, Kyoto, 606-01, Japan, Tel: +81-75-753-7131, Fax: +81-75-753-
7138, E-mail: osano@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
1Abstract
  We examine the institutional arrangements which achieve the second-best allocation
corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a fiscal authority and a central
bank, whose policies interact through a consolidated government budget constraint, under the
assumption that those policy makers are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and
they ignore the strategic interaction between their policies.  Our results suggest that the
practically best institutional arrangement is an instrument-independent central bank which controls
for money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to some numerical inflation
target that depends on fiscal variables.  Although the second-best allocation could be supported
by an instrument-independent central bank with a performance contract, it is practically difficult to
implement a lump-sum transfer payment for a central banker.  Furthermore, the second-best
allocation cannot be attained by a performance ontract or a targeting scheme for the fiscal
authority alone.  These results indicate that the numerical targets for the budget deficit tog ther
with the independent central bank, o served in the United States and the EU countries, d  ot
ensure the good performance of the economy.  The simpler and better solution is to have an
independent central bank with an inflation target.
Key Words : inflation contract, inflation targeting, independent central bank.
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21. Introduction
The idea that the most important prerequisite for the conduct of monetary policy is an
independent central bank now becomes a global standard among both academic researchers and
policy makers.  This idea provides a basis for many institutional changes including the
establishment of European Central bank nd the reforms of central bank laws in many countries
such as England, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea as well as Transitional Economies.  The
influential models supporting the idea of an independent central bank in macroeconomics after the
seminal paper of  Rogoff [1985] are built on the models of dynamic inconsistency by Kydland and
Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983]: a monetary authority faces an incentive to expand
output above the equilibrium level so that an inflationary bias exists without policy commitment.
Among others, the important work of Walsh [1995] shows that there is no trade-off between the
inflation bias and the stabilization of output once the society off rs a linear performance contract
based on the realized rate of inflation to the central banker.  Svensson [1997] suggests that an
inflation target, which is actually adopted in recent years by a number of industrial countries
including Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and  United King om,
is regarded as a counterpart of the linear performance contract à l  Walsh in the real world.  Since
Walsh [1995] and Svensson [1997] assume a stable relationship between the growth rate of money
supply and the rate of inflation on average, the models of inflation targeting theoretically extend the
idea of uncontingent monetary targeting advocated by Friedman [1960] and Kydland and Prescott
[1977] into the contingent optimal policy plan.
Nevertheless, it remains an unresolved question of how the role of an independent central bank is
affected by a strategic interaction between a fiscal authority and a central bank in the absence of
their policy commitment.  The purpose of this paper is to consider whether or not the practically
best solution to achieve the second-best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the
policy commitment of the two policy makers is still an independent central bank with a
performance contract or a targeting scheme even if the strategic interaction between the two policy
makers without their policy commitment is explicitly accounted for.
We explore the following three interesting issues by examining the strategic interaction between
the two policy makers without their policy commitment.  First, the fiscal authority as well as the
central bank has an incentive to expand output above the equilibrium level.  Thus, we need to
investigate whether or not a performance contract or a targeting scheme is effective to restore the
efficiency of the economy in the absence of the policy commitment of both the fiscal authority and
the central bank.
Second, in addition to the non-commitment problem of the policy makers, we need to tackle a
3non-coordination problem between the fiscal authority and the central bank.  This problem adds
new distortions if the optimal combinations of fiscal and monetary policies are not attained.  Thus,
we also need to have another investigation of whether a performance contract or a targeting
scheme can eliminate the distortions caused by the non-coordination between the fiscal authority
and the central bank.
Finally, we can discuss the relationship between the studies of central bank independence and the
studies regarding budget rules (see Poterba [1997] for recent review) for the fiscal authority.  The
conventional idea for justifying an operationally independent central bank separated from the fiscal
authority is based on the historical experience that the government pursues inflationary policy for
many reasons; and as a result, the society would be better off by having a mechanism that prevents
the government from issuing excessive fiat money.  One plausible institutional solution to achieve
this objective is an operationally independent central bank that is committed to monetary targeting
or gold standard before the World War I.  This view is strongly supported by the studies of public
choice (for example, Buchanan and Wagner [1981]), long before the recent studies of central bank
independence have appeared.  Even though such a view is correct, we might well wonder if we do
not need to have an independent central bank once we can impose some rules for the fiscal
authority which constrain its inflationary policy.  Indeed, in the EU countries, Japan, and the
United States, they do have operationally independent central banks and some numerical targets for
the budget deficit simultaneously.  Could budget rules substituted for an independent central bank,
or do we need both of them to achieve the efficient resource allocation of the economy?
  To answer these questions, we extend the analysis of Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997] by
allowing for the possibility that the society can offer a performance contract or a targeting scheme
to the monetary authority.  We model a strategic interaction between the central bank which
controls for monetary policy and the fiscal authority which determines the tax ate, the gov rnment
spending, and the path of public debt.  In this model, we view the source of a supply shock in
Walsh [1995] as a policy shock by the fiscal authority and make the consolidated government
budget constraint explicit.  In analyzing the model, we are concerned with two kinds of strategic
interactions between the fiscal authority and the central bank in the absence of their policy
commitment.  One is the case in which the fiscal authority and the central bank re integrated.
We call this case the “integrated agency without commitment”.  The other is the case in which
these two policy makers are independent of one another and they can ot coordinate their policy
decisions.  This case is called the “non-coordination without commitment”.
The results obtained in this paper r  summarized as follows.  First, the second-best allocation
is still achieved by a performance contract in each of the “integrated agency without commitment”
4and the “non-coordination without commitment”.  The performance contract for the “integrated
agency without commitment” d pends on both the realized levels of the inflation rate and the public
debt level, and the performance contract for the central bank under the assumption of “non-
coordination without commitment” is based only on the realized inflation rate.  However, the
coefficient on the realized inflation rate in the second period, or the penalty to increase one percent
in the rate of inflation in the second period, negatively correlates with the government financing
requirements, which depends on the level of public debt, in both cases.  Therefore, both the
realized levels of the inflation rate and the public debt level affect the penalty schedules determined
by the performance contracts.
Second, the second-best allocation is also attained by a targeting scheme consisting of both an
inflation target and a public debt target under the “integ ated agency without commitment”, and by
a targeting scheme consisting of an inflation target alone under the “non-coo dination without
commitment”.  The optimal inflation target also negatively correlates with the government
financing requirements in each of these cases.  In practice, the targeting scheme is a much simpler
policy institutional arrangement than the performance contract.  In particular, the targeting
scheme does not require a policy instrument for financing contract transfer payments; but the
performance contract does.  Hence, this result implies that the targeting scheme is a more useful
policy instrument than the performance contract.  Furthermore, the optimal targeting scheme
under the “integrated agency without commitment” involves both the inflation rate and the public
debt level, while the optimal targeting scheme under the “no -coordination without commitment”
involves only the inflation rate.  Since it is practically difficult for the society not only to find
someone who feels losses from the excessive amount of debt but also to implement the targets of
the inflation rate and the public debt level simultaneously, this finding suggests that an independent
central bank with an inflation target, separated with the fiscal authority, is better than a central bank
integrated with the fiscal authority in order to solve for the problem of an inflationary bias.  Our
view is consistent with the reasoning based on the historical experience that the excessive
accumulation of government debt becomes generally possible as a result of the political pressure
and the lack of an operationally independent central bank which constrains such a government
funding; therefore, the debt target is not credible and it is better to have an operationally
independent central bank from the government financing requirement.
Finally, the second-best allocation cannot be attained by a contract for the fiscal authority under
the “non-coordination without commitment”.  Thus, a well disciplined fiscal authority in this
sense cannot become a substitute for an independent central bank.  This result shows that the
numerical targets for the budget deficit tog ther with the independent central bank, observedin the
5EU countries, Japan, and the United States, do not ensure the good performance of the economy.
The simpler and better solution is to have an independent central bank with an inflation target that
negatively correlates with the government financing requirements to control for the excessive
public spending.
Our research is related to several strands of literature.  The topics of the inflation contract and
targeting are rapidly emerging (see Persson and Tabellini [1993], Walsh [1995], Svensson [1997],
the special issue of Journal of Monetary Economics [1997], and Jonsson [1997]).  Our work
differs from theirs in that it explicitly examines the government budget constraint and the strategic
interaction between the fiscal authority and the central bank.  Moreover, we consider the situation
where the private sector, rather than the fiscal authority, can offer a performance contract or a
targeting scheme for the central bank, although in some countries, the Minister of Finance
negotiates with the central bank regarding the level of the inflation target.
Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997] discusses the strategic interaction between the fiscal authority
and the central bank.  However, they do not consider a performance contract or an inflation
target.  Instead, they study only the combination of the debt target and the weight-conservative,
independent central bank à la Rogoff [1985] as a plausible optimal institutional design.  On the
other hand, our analysis shows that not only the performance contract but also the “inflation-
target- and debt-target-conservative” integrated agency (or the “inflation-target-conservative”
central bank) à la Svensson [1997] achieve the second-best allocation under the “i t grated agency
without commitment” (or the “non-coordination without commitment”).  Furthermore, the
“inflation-target-conservative” central bank is superior to the “inflation-target- and debt-target-
conservative” integrated agency because it is practically difficult for the policy makers to
implement a public debt targeting and to find someone who prefers a lower rate of inflation.
Sargent and Wallace [1981] argues that if the fiscal and monetary authorities are independent of
one another, it is important to allow the monetary authority to impose a lower rate of debt
accumulation on the fiscal authority, in order to assure that the monetary authority can control for
the rate of inflation.  Our results are much stronger than their recommendation, because our
“inflation-target-conservative” central bank can achieve the second-best allocation by controlling
for inflation.  Since the fiscal authority takes the decision of the central bank as given if the
instrument independence of the central bank is guaranteed, the fiscal authority needs to make the
government spending consistent with the rate of inflation chosen by the central bank even though
the fiscal authority chooses the amount of debt.  This result is attributed to the assumption that
the private sector (or the representative of the private sector), rather than the fiscal authority, offers
a performance contract or an inflation target to the central bank.
6  The rest of out paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.1 describes the basic model.  Section
2.2 characterizes a solution of the model under the assumption that the fiscal authority and the
central bank are integrated and are credibly committed to their policy announcements.  This is the
benchmark case and called the second-best.  Section 2.3 gives a solution under the  integrated
agency without commitment , where the integrated agency cannot be committed to their policy
announcements.  Section 2.4 studies the case of the  non-coordination without commitment ,
where neither their policy coordination nor their commitments to their policy announcements are
possible. On the basis of the models presented in section 2, section 3 develops our main analysis.
Section 3.1 discusses whether or not a performance contract for the integrated agency (or the
central bank) à la Walsh can lead to the second-best allocation under the “integrated agency
without commitment” (or the “non-coordination without commitment”).  Section 3.2 examines
the issue of an optimal targeting scheme in each of these two cases.  Section 3.3 evaluates the
practical advantages of the performance contract and targeting schemes under each of the
integrated agency and the independent central bank, and investigates which combination of the
policy instrument and the authority organization is more practically advantageous.  Section 4
concludes our paper.
2.  The Model
  In this section, we analyze  two period model based on Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997], and
derive the conditions for an optimal solution.  
 
2.1. The basic model
Let us consider a game between three ag nts: the private sector, the fiscal authority
(government), and the monetary authority (cen ral bank).
In the private sector, nominal wages are concluded before the policy makers choose their
policies.  Thus, unless the policy makers announce an inflation rate and commit themselves to it at
the beginning of each period before nominal wages are set, th y can cause unexpected inflation to
boost the economy; and the private sector acts as a Stackelberg leader for the policy makersby
expecting their actions in advance.  Using the arguments of Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997], we
can then characterize the behavior of the private sector in period t by a Lucas supply function with
government taxation:1
  ),( t
e
tttx tppn --=   t = 1, 2, ( 1)
where x t  denotes the (normalized) output in period t, n the constant parameter, p t  the inflation
7rate in period t, p t
e  the inflation rate expected by the private sector in period t, and tt  the tax rate
in period t.  If there exist no tax distortions ( tt =0), the (normalized) output x t  is reduced to 0 in a
rational expectations equilibrium because of p pt t
e= .  Thus, this (normalized) output level
corresponds to the natural rate of employment.  I  fact, the socially desirable (normalized) output
~xt  without tax distortions in period t is allowed to be positive because the socially desirable
employment level is assumed to exceed the natural rate of employment.  Furthermore, since we
allow for non-tax distortions due to union power in the labor market or monopoly power in the
commodity market, we can take ~xt  as the output level attained in the second-best allocation.2
  The government budget constraint in period t is given by3
  ,)1( 1 ttttt ddg ++£++ - kptr    t = 1, 2. ( 2)
Here, tg  indicates the government spending as a share of the output realized without tax
distortions or inflation surprises in p riod t, r  the real interest rate, k  the revenues from real money
holdings as a share of the outputrealized without tax distortions or inflation surprises, and td  the
amount of newly issued public debt as a share of the output realized without tax distortions or
inflation surprises in period t.  From now on, we will assume that 0 < k  < 1 throughout this
paper.4   We also assume that all public debt is indexed a  matures after one period.  S nce
td  expresses the amount of newly issued public debt (as a share of the output realized without tax
distortions or inflation surprises) in period t, 1-td  denotes the amount of public debt (as a share of
the output realized without tax distortions or inflation surprises) ca ried over from period t-1 to
period t.  Because of the two period economy, all public debt is paid off at the end of period 2 so
that 2d = 0.  Furthermore, 0d  is assumed to be given exogenously.
For convenience of the analysis, we rewrite inequality ( 2) to define the “government financing
requirement”:
  GFR d K d d
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where 
~ ~ ~ /K g xt t tº + n .
  The government has perfect control over the tax rat, the government spending, and the amount
of newly issued public debtin each period, whereas the central bank has perfect control over the
inflation rate in each period.  This assumption implies that the government can choose t t, tg , and
td  in each period while the central bank can choose tp  in each period.
The society has the social loss function V, which is represented by
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where pa  > 0, ga  > 0, and 0 < b  £ 1.  Here, b denotes the discount factor, tx
~ the socially
desirable (normalized) output in period t, and tg
~ the government spending target as th  optimal
share of the output realized without tax distortions or inflation surprises in period t.  We assume
for simplicity that both the government and the central bank have the same loss function as the
society.
　In the subsequent analysis, we will discuss three cases to model the various aspects of the
strategic interaction between the government and the central bank.  First, we deal with the
situation in which the government and the central bank are integrated and are credibly committed
to their policy announcements.  The credible commitment particularly implies that the policy
makers announce an inflation rate and commit themselves to the announced rate at the beginning of
each period before nominal wages are concluded.  This is called the “second-best” or the
benchmark case.  Secondly, we investigate he case in which the government and the central bank
are still integrated but are not able to commit themselves to their policy announcements.  Since
nominal wages are set before the policy makers choose their policies, the private sector in this case
acts as a Stackelberg leader for the policy makers.  As a result, when choosing the decisions, the
policy makers must make do with taking the inflation expectations of the private sector as
exogenously given.  We call this the “integrated agency without commitment”.  Finally, we
consider the “non-coordination without commitment”.  In this case, the two policy makers are
independent of one another.  Furthermore, they can neither coordinate their policy decisions nor
commit themselves to their policy announcements.  The “non-coordination without commitment”
can be interpreted such that the government delegates monetary policy to a central bank with both
goal and instrument independence: in other words, the government delegates monetary policy to an
instrument-independent central bank that is assigned a particular loss function.5
2.2. Second-best: benchmark case
  In this subsection, we analyze the most desirable case, where the two policy makers are
integrated and are committed to their policy announcements.  To solve for the two period
decision problem, we use the backward induction method.  Thus, we begin with solving for the
solution in the second period and then proceed to s lve for the solution i the first period.
92.2.1. Rational expectations equilibrium in the second period
Let us first describe the second period problem of the integrated agency.
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The constraints of the second period problem consist of the Lucas supply function (1) in period 2,
the government financing requirement (3) in period 2, and the restriction generated by the rational
expectations formation of the private sector. To make the mathematical expression easier, let
º- n/tf tt + tx
~/n  denote the explicit and implicit tax revenues in period t,6  and º- th tt gg -
~
denote the government spending gap in period t, r spectively.  Now, for t = 2, we substitute (1)
into (5) and rearrange the resulting second period social loss nd the government financing
requirement (3) with tf  = -n tt - tx~ and th  = -( tt gg -~ ).  Under the rational expectations of the
private sector ( 22 pp =
e ), the optimal decision problem of the integrated agency in the second
period is then specified as follows:
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  In this optimal decision problem, the strategic variables controlled by the integrated agency are
made up of the inflation rate in period 2, 2p , the explicit and implicit tax revenues in period 2,
n/2f- , and the government spending gap in period 2, 2h- . Note that 2d  is always set to zero
because all public debt is paid off at the end of period 2.  Since the integrated agency announces
2p  and can commit itself to the rate, the inflation rate expected by the private sector, 
e
2p , is giv n
by 2p  in (8) under the rational expectations of the private sector.  This implies that the integrated
agency is prevented from causing unexpected inflation to boost the economy.
  The first-order conditions for the choice of 2p , 2f , and 2h  are
  - + =a Sp p l k2 2 0, ( 9)
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2 dh  denote the solution to this problem, which satisfies (7) and (9)-(11).
2.2.2. Rational expectations equilibrium in the first period
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2 dh , we next
describe the first period problem of the int grated agency by su stituting (1) into the social loss
function (4) and rearranging the resulting social loss function and the government financing
requirement (3) in period 1 with tf  = -n tt - tx~ and th  = -( tt gg -~ ):
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  The integrated agency in period 1 can choose the inflation rate in period 1, 1p , the xplicit and
implicit tax revenues in period 1, n/1f- , the government spending gap in period 1, 1h- , and the




2 dfdp ))( 1
*
2 dh .  The integrated agency
also announces 1p and )( 1
*
2 dp , and can commit itself to them.  Thus, under the rational
expectations of the private sector, the inflation rates expected by the private sector, e1p
  and e2p ,
are provided by 1p in (14) and )( 1
*
2 dp  in (15), respectively.  As a result, the integrated agency is
again prevented from causing unexpected inflation to boost the economy.
  The first-order conditions with respect to 1p , 1f , 1h , and 1d  are
  - + =a Sp p l k1 1 0, ( 16)
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where 1Sl  is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with (13).  The rational expectations
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2 dh  that are determined by (7) and (9)-(11).  As mentioned in the
subsection 2.2., this equilibrium is second-best.
2.3. Integrated agency without commitment
In this subsection, we retain the assumption that the government and the central bank are
integrated.  However, we drop the assumption that the integrated agency announces an inflation
rate and commits itself to the announced rate.  Thus, the integrated agency cannot avoid a
temptation to cause unexpected inflation to raise the output of the economy to the bliss point even
though in the long run such an expansion is not feasible.  Since nominal wages are set before the
integrated agency chooses its decisions, the integrated agency takes the private sector’s inflation
expectation as given when choosing its decisions.  Hence, the private sector acts as a Stackelberg
leader for the integrated agency.
       
2.3.1. Rational expectations equilibrium in the second period
Because the integrated agency takes the private sector’s inflation expectation e2p  as exogenously
given in the second period problem, we substitute (1) into (5) for given e2p
 and rearrange the
resulting second period social loss nd the government financing requirement (3) with tf  = -n tt -
tx
~ and th  = -( tt gg -~ ) for t = 2.  Then, we describe the decision problem of the integrated
agency choosing the optimal policies in th  second period:
  min ( [ ( ) ] ),
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  e2p : given. ( 22)
Note that the expected inflation rate e2p  is not usually equal to the actual inflation rate 2p  at the
stage of the second period optimization problem of the integrated agency in this case.
  The first-order conditions with respect to 2p , 2f , and 2h  are written by
12
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  -ag 2h - 2Il  = 0, ( 25)
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2 dh  denote the solution to this problem, which satisfies (21) and (23)-(25).
In fact, under the rational expectations equilibrium, we see 22 pp =
e .  Thus, we can replace
(23) and (24) by the following conditions under the rational expectations equilibrium:
  ,0222 =+-- klnpp Ifa (23´)
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2 dh  does not depend on the expected inflation rate 
e
2p  because
(21), (23´ ), (24´), and (25) are independent of e2p .      
  Comparing the system of (21), (23´ ), (24´), and (25) with that of (7) and (9)-(11), we find an
extra term n2f-  = (n 2t + 2~x )n in (23´ ).  This term captures an inflation bias in the second
period under the integrated agency without commitment because of 2f  < 0 from (24´ ) and
7
2 .0>Il   The inflation bias arises from the discretionary policies chosen by the integrated agency
in the second period because the integrated agency takes e2p  as given and is induced to increase the
output of the economy.
2.3.2. Rational expectations equilibrium in the first period
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2 dh , we now
represent the first period problem of the int grated agency by su stituting (1) into the social loss
function (4) for given e1p  and 
e
2p
 = )( 1
**
2 dp  and rearranging the resulting social loss function and
the government financing requirement (3) in period 1 with tf  = -n tt - tx~ and th  = -( tt gg -~ ):
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  e1p : given, ( 28)
  p p2 2 1
e d= **( ). ( 29)
  Several remarks on the decision problem (26) are in order.  First, the integrated agency is not
able to be committed to the announced rate in the first period, whereas nominal wages in the first
period are set before the integrated agency chooses its decisions.  Thus, the integrated agency
must take the expected inflation rate e1p in the first period as given when choosing its decisions.
Hence, the integrated agency is induced to cause unexpected inflation to boost the economy in the
first period.  Second, the integrated agency can choose the policy decisions in the first period
before nominal wages in the second period are set.  Thus, the integrated agency can anticipate the
inflation rate )( 1
**
2 dp  expected by the private sector in the second period under the rational
expectations equilibrium and affect it through the policies chosen in the first period.  In particular,
the expected inflation rate in the second period depends on the government debt chosen by the
integrated agency in the first period.
  The first-order conditions with respect to 1p , 1f , 1h , and 1d  are described by
  - - - + + =a f
e
Ip p n p p n l k1 1 1 1 1 0[ ( ) ] , ( 30)
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where 1Il  is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with (27).  The optimal solution to







2 dh  that are determined by (21), (23´ ), (24´), and (25).
Because of 11 pp =
e  under the rational expectations equilibrium, we can actually replace (30) and
(31) by
  - - + =a f Ip p n l k1 1 1 0, (30´)
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Then, we should notice hat this solution does not depend on the expect d inflation rate e1p
because these equations a d inequalities are independent of e1p .  Thus, we only have to mention
that e1p  is given by the rational expectations of the private sector under the rational expectations
equilibrium.
  Comparing the system of (27), (30)´, (31´), (32), and (33) with that of (13) and (16)-(19), we
understand that there exists an extra term n1f-  = (n 1t +1~x )n in (30´).  As in the second period
case, this term again indicates an inflatio bias in the first period under the integrated agency
without commitment, given 1f  < 0 from (31)´ and 1Il  > 0
8.   The inflation gap is caused from the
discretionary policies chosen by the integrated agency in the first period because the integrated
agency takes e1p  as given and is induced to increase the output of the economy.
2.4. Non-coordination without commitment
  We now discuss the case of the “non-coordination without commitment”, in which the two
policy makers are not integrated; furthermore, they can neithercoordinate their policy decisions
nor commit themselves to their policy announcements.  Since the two policy makers can ot
coordinate their policy decisions, we need to consider the decision making of the government and
the central bank separately.
2.4.1. Rational expectations equilibrium in the second period
  First, let us examine the behavior of the government.  Since the government is assumed to be
able to choose tt , td , and tg  in each period, the decision variables of the government consist of
2f  and 2h  in period 2, given 2d = 0. The second period problem for the government is thus
specified by
  min ( [ ( ) ] ),
,f h
e
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  2p ,  
e
2p : given. ( 36)
Note that the government takes not only the expected inflation rate e2p  as given but also the
realized inflation rate 2p  as given because 2p  is determined by the central bank.
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  The first-order conditions for the choice of 2f  and 2h  are
  - - + + - =[ ( ) ] ( )n p p l




  -agh2 - 2Nl  = 0, ( 38)
where 2Nl  is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with (35).
  Next, we investigate he behavior of the central bank.  Si ce the central bank is assumed to be
able to choose tp in each period without taking into account of the government financing
requirement and the government fiscal decisions, the central bank’sd cision problem is represented
by
   min ( [ ( ) ] ),
p p
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   subject to e2p : given. ( 40)
  The first-order condition with respect to 2p  is then
   - - - + =a f
e
p p n p p n2 2 2 2 0[ ( ) ] . ( 41)
Since 22 pp =
e  under the rational expectations equilibrium, we can replace equations (37) and (41)
by
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  The rational expectations equilibrium in the second period is now given by (35), (37´ ), (38), and
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2 dfdp ))( 1
***
2 dh  does not depend on the expected
inflation rate e2p  because (35), (37´ ), (38), and (41´ ) are independent of 
e
2p .  
  Comparing the system of (35), (37´ ), (38), and (41´ ) with that of (7) and (9)-(11), we see that
the differences are reduced to only the differences in the second terms of (9) and (41´ ).  Thus, if k
= 1, the first-order conditions of these two cases are identical because it follows from (10) and
(37´) that 222 SN f lnl =-= .  Indeed, we assume 0 < k  < 1 due to the statistical findings.
Hence, these differences exist and reflect an inflation bias in the second period under the non-
coordination without commitment.  The inflation bias is caused by the lack of not only
commitment but also policy coordination.
16





2 dfdp ))( 1
***
2 dh , the government in the first period faces the following
problem:
  min ( [ ( ) ] )
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( 43)
  1p ,  
e
1p
 : given, ( 44)
  ).( 1
***
22 d
e pp = ( 45)
  Several remarks on the decision problem (42) are in order.  First, the government cannot
choose an inflation rate in the first period while nominal wages in the first period are set before the
government chooses his decision.  Thus, the government takes both the realized inflation a d
expected inflation rates in the first period as given when choosing is decisions.  Second, the
government selects the policy decisions i  the first period before nominal wages in the second
period are set.  Thus, the gov rnment anticipates the inflation rate expected by the private sector
in the second period under the rational expectations equilibrium.  In particular, the government
can affect the expected inflation rate in the second period by adjusting the amount of the first
period government debt.
  The first-order conditions with respect to 1f , 1h , and 1d  are
  - - + + - =[ ( ) ] ( )n p p l



























































where 1Nl  is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with (43).




2 dfdp ))( 1
***
2 dh , the central bank’s decision problem in
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the first period is characterized by
  min ( [ ( ) ] )
{ [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )] },*** *** ***
p p
p
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+ - + +
+ + +
( 49)
  subject to e1p : given, ( 50)
   e2p
 = )( 1
***
2 dp . ( 51)
The remarks imilar to those on the government decision problem (42) can also be applied to this
problem, except that the central bank can select the inflation rate in period 1.
  The first-order condition with respect to 1p  is then
  - - - + =a f
e
p p n p p n1 1 1 1 0[ ( ) ] . ( 52)
Because of 11 pp =
e  under the rational expectations equilibrium, the conditions (46) and (52) can
be substituted by






  - - =a fp p n1 1 0.  (52´ )
  The rational expectations equilibrium in the first period is now characterized by (43), (46´ ), (47),




2 dfdp ))( 1
***
2 dh  that are determined by (35),
(37´ ), (38), and (41´ ).  We should notice that his solution does not depend on the expected
inflation rate e1p  because these equations and inequalities are independent of 
e
1p .  Thus, we only
have to state that e1p  is determined by the rational expectations of the private sector under the
rational expectations equilibrium.
  Comparing the system of (43), (46´ ), (47), (48), and (52´ ) with that of (13) and (16)-(19), we
see that the differences between these two cases are reduced tohe differences in the second terms
of (16) and (52´ ).  Since (17) and (46)´ show that 111 SN f lnl =-= , the first-order conditions of
the second-best and those of “non-coordination without commitment” are identical if k  = 1.
However, as explained before, based on the empirical evidence, we assume 0 < k  < 1.  Hence,
these differences exist and indicate n inflation bias in the first period under the non-coordination
without commitment.  The inflation bias is caused by the lack of not only commitment but also
policy coordination.
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3. Optimal Performance Contracts and Targeting Schemes for Policy Makers
In the preceding section, we have discussed the features of the model of Beetsma and Bovenberg
[1997], which is concerned with the strategic interaction between the government (fiscal authority)
and the central bank.  Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997] shows that the second-best equilibrium
allocation in this economy is restored by the combination of an optimal debt target and a
decentralized, independent central banker with the appropriate degree of conservatism à la Rogoff
[1985].  Instead, in this section, we first consider whether or not the second-best equilibrium
allocation can be attained by a performance contract à la Walsh [1995] offered by the
representative of the private sector (or the Congress) to the integrated agency in the case of the
“integrated agency without commitment”9  or to the central bank in the case of the “non-
coordination without commitment”.  We next explore whether or not the second-best equilibrium
allocation can also be achieved by a targeting scheme in these two distortionary cases.  Finally, for
practical reasons, we argue that the best solution among these schemes including the one suggested
by Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997] is a decentralized, independent central bank with an inflation
target.
3.1. Optimal performance contracts
  Since the loss function is quadratic, we only have to examine a simple class of performance
contracts.  Let Itw  = 
a







It dw+  denote a contract transfer payment from the
government budget to he integrated agency in the case of the “integrated agency without




Ntw tp  denote a contract transfer payment from the government
budget to he central bank in the cas of the “non-coordination without commitment”, respectively.
  In fact, since all the variables in the model are verified, we can show that there are many
contracts that would achieve the desired result: for example, the second-best allocation can be
achieved by any contract that imposes a large penalty on the integrated agency (or the central bank)
if ),( tt dp  (or tp  alone) deviates from the desired level.
10  However, as Walsh [1995] has argued,
such knife-edge solutions are of little practical interest.  Although our model does not assume
uncertainty in the aggregate supply shock, these knife-edge solutions cause the Congress to have
difficulty specifying a complete set of rules to follow under all contingencies if the Congress cannot
verify the aggregate supply shock correctly in the actual economy.  We therefore focus on the
class of linear or quadratic performance contracts with respect to the inflation rate and the public
19
debt level because this class of contracts has practical advantages over the other complicated
contracts.




Ntt ) under the “integrated agency without commitment” (“non-coordination without
commitment”).  Since ktw  = 
C
ktt  for k = I, N and t = 1, 2, we still represent the government
financing requirement constraints as (21) and (27) ((35) and (43)) under the “integrated agency
without commitment” (“non-coordination without commitment”).
  The performance ontract adds benefits contingent on the inflation rate and the public debt
amount (or the inflation rate alone) to the loss function of the integrated agency (or the central
bank).  We assume that the integrated agency and the central bank care about both the transfer
they receive and the social loss generated by inflation, output, and government spending
fluctuations.  We also assume that the preferences of the integrated agency and the central bank
are separable in income and social loss, and that these agents are risk neutral with respect to

























Since we assume that the reservation utility level of the integrated agency or the central bank is
normalized to zero in each period, we must consider the participation constraint for the integrated
agency or the central bank which motivates them to participate in the performance contract.  This
requirement is given by










tkt Vwb 0³ ,   k = I or N. ( 53)
The participation constraint is only used to determine the constant term of the performance
contract, aktw  for k = I, N.
Given the modified objective function and the participation constraint (53), we now discuss
how the Congress can design a performance contract to attain the second-best equilibrium
allocation in each of the cases of the “integrated agency without commitment” and the “non-
coordination without commitment”.  To this end, let us notice that the government and the central
bank under a performance contract with lump-sum taxes Cktt  face the same constraints as those in
the absence of any performance contracts, and that the participation constraint under a
performance contract is only used to determine the constant term of the performance contract.
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Due to these remarks, under the “integrated agency without commitment”, the integrated agency
to which a performance contract is offered solves the following problems in periods 1 and 2:
  min{ ( [ ( ) ] ) },
, ,p p
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2 )]([ dhC } )( 1
**
22 dw CI pb
p- },
subject to (27), (28), and (29),
( 55)
where ( )( 1
**
2 dCp , )( 1
**
2 dfC , )( 1
**
2 dhC ) is an optimal solution to (54).
11  Note that the minimization
of the loss function of the integrated agency is equivalent to the maximization of the utility function
of the integrated agency.
Similarly, under the “non-coordination without commitment”, the central bank to which a
performance contract is offered solves the following problems in periods 1 and 2:
  
  min{ ( [ ( ) ] ) },
p p









2 2a f a h w
e



























2 )]([ dhC }
pb 2Nw- )( 1
***
2 dCp },
subject to (50) and (51),
( 57)
where ( )( 1
***
2 dCp , )( 1
***
2 dfC , )( 1
***
2 dhC ) is an optimal solution to (56).
12  Again, note that the
minimization of the loss function of the central bank is equivalent to the maximization of the utility
function of the central bank.  We should also notice that in this case, the government’s problems
in periods 1 and 2 are the same as those of the minimization problems (34) and (42), respectively.13
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Solving these problems by the procedure explained in the Appendix A, we see that the second-








2ˆIw ) under the
“integrated agency without commitment” and the performance contract (p 1ˆNw ,
p
2ˆNw ) under the
“non-coordination without commitment”:
  p
2ˆIw  = - C
dGFR )( 12 , ( 58)
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2ˆNw  = -(1-k ) C
dGFR )( 12 , ( 62)
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Note that the constant term aItwˆ  (
a
Ntwˆ ) for t = 1, 2 is determined so as to satisfy the participation
constraint for the integrated agency (central bank).  Since we have two unknown variables in the
single equation, we can only determine the intertemporal ratio of the constant terms, aIw 2ˆ /
a
Iw 1ˆ
( aNw 2ˆ /
a
Nw 1ˆ ).  From now on, the performance contract that achieves the second-best allocation in
each distortionary caseis d fined as an optimal performance contract.
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Several remarks on the optimal performance contracts are in order.  First, equations (58), (59),
and (62)-(66) show that the coefficient on the inflation rate in period 2 is negatively related to the
government financing requirement in period 2; and the coefficient on the inflation rate in period 1 is
also negatively related to the discounted present value of the government financing requirements
from period 1 to period 2.  This implies that, as the government financing requirement is larger,
the slope of the optimal performance contract with respect to the inflation rate becomes steeper.
Note that, since we assume 0 < k < 1, this finding holds regardless of whether the Congress deals
with the situation of the “integrated agency without commitment” or the “non-coordination
without commitment”.14  The optimal performance contracts suggested by Walsh [1995] and
Svensson [1997] do not share this feature because they consider neither the fiscal authority nor the
government financing requirement constraint.
Second, equations (60), (61), and (64)-(66) indicate that the coefficients on both the linear and
quadratic terms of the debt level in period 1 are nonzero under the “integrated agency without


















This equation might imply that under the “integrated agency without commitment”, the slope of the
optimal performance contract with respect to the debt level in period 1 is positively related to the
government financing requirement in period 2.  Indeed, this ‘dir ct’ effect cancels out the effect of
a change in 1d  on the contract transfer payment with respect to the inflation rate in period 2,
)(ˆ 1
**
22 dw CI p
p , as shown in (A15) in the Appendix A.
Finally, these optimal performance contracts depend on several parameters that are estimated
and calculated by actual data: the government financing requirement in each period, )( 1-tt dGFR ,
the preference parameters of the society, (pa , ga ), the inverse of the velocity of money, k , the
production elasticity of labor, h º n /(1+n ),15 the discount factor of the society, b , and the interest
rate, r .
3.2. Implementation of performance contract through targeting schemes
The analysis in subsection 3.1 makes theoretically clear that the second best allocation could be
supported by the performance contract.  However, there is neither a central bank governor nor
government official who actually faces such a contract.  Svensson [1997] suggests that the
performance contract proposed by Walsh [1995] is implemented by the inflation targeting, which is
23
becoming very common in the real world.  In this subsection, we would like to examine how the
suggestion of Svensson [1997] is modified in our model.  In particular, we consider if we can
regard the optimal performance contracts we have examined in subsection 3.1 as targeting schemes.
We admit that there could be other ways to achieve the second best allocation once we discuss
general classes of targeting schemes.  We will not try to prove that our targeting scheme is the
unique institutional arrangement which achieves the second best allocation within the general
classes of targeting schemes. Rather, we show that the optimal performance contract considered in
the previous section could be implemented by a simple targeting scheme, which is practically more
interesting.  We believe that our restriction to a class of targeting scheme is justified because the
targeting schemes we will analyze in the subsequent analysis can always support the second best
allocation of resources.
Under the “integrated agency without commitment”, it follows from the discussions of the
Appendix B with (58)-(61) that the second-best outcome is achieved by an integrated agency
which solves the following targeting problem in each period:
  min
, ,p 2 2 2f h 2
1
{ 222 )



























b { pa 221**2 ]~)([ IT d pp - 21**2 )]([ dfT+ ga+ 21**2 )]([ dhT };
subject to (27), (28), and (29).
( 69)
Here, ( )( 1
**
2 dTp , )( 1
**
2 dfT , )( 1
**
2 dhT ) is an optimal solution to (68),
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where *1d  is the second-best level of debt and )1(
~
2 r+- K  is the first-best level of debt, which is
derived from (3) at t = 2 under the evaluation of 0~ 2222 ==== pt xd  and .
~








Iw  consist of the exogenous parameters, as shown in (59)-(61).  We should also
notice that the integrated agency takes the residual term in (68), p
p awI
2
2)ˆ(- , as exogenous when
choosing its decision in period 2.  The same remark can be applied to Q2 of (69).  Furthermore,
the derivation procedure in the Appendix B ensures that the second-period targeting problem (68)
is dynamically consistent with the first-period targeting problem (69).
Under the “non-coordination without commitment”, it follows from (62) and (63) that the
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subject to (50) and (51).
( 73)






2 dhdfd TTTp ) is an optimal solution to (72);














Nt =-=    t = 1, 2.
( 74)
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  We should add several comments on these targeting schemes.  First, the relevant inflation
target under the “integrated agency without commitment”, Itp
~ , becomes negative because 0<tf
from (24´), (31´), and 0>Itl .
18  Similarly, given the assumption of 0 < k < 1, the relevant
inflation target under the “non-coordination without commitment”, Ntp
~ , is also negative due to
0<tf  from (37´), (46´), and 0>Ntl .
19  These findings suggest that the negative inflation target
scheme should be used under both the “integrated agency without commitment” and the “non-
coordination without commitment”.
Second, Svensson [1997] shows that the constant inflation target eliminates the constant
inflation bias à la Walsh [1995] and attains the second-best outcome.  On the other hand, our
targeting solutions in the two distortionary cases share the same characteristics as those in the
lagged employment case of Svensson [1997]; that is, the relevant inflation target changes over time.
More specifically, it follows from (58), (59), (62)-(66), (70), and (74) that the optimal inflation
target in period 2 inversely varies with the government financing requirement in period 2; and that
the optimal inflation target in period 1 also inversely varies with the discounted present value of the
government financing requirements from period 1 to period 2.  This is so because the integrated
agency (central bank) cares about both the inflation-output trade off and the government spending
gap under the “integrated agency without commitment” (“non-coordination without commitment”).
Thus, although our loss function implies that the zero inflation rate is the first-best inflation rate,
these findings lead us to conclude that the integrated agency (central bank) should choose a time-
varying negative inflation target under the “integrated agency without commitment” (“non-
coordination without commitment”).
Third, the final equation of (71) suggests that the relevant debt target level under the “int grated
agency without commitment” is equal to (second-best level of debt) + (constant)×(negative
inflation target).  This implies that the optimal debt targeting level in this case is less than the
second-best level of debt: in particular, the optimal debt targeting level is exactly equal to the first-
best level of debt.
Finally, the most important finding in these targeting schemes is that under the “integrated
agency without commitment”, not only the inflation targeting scheme but also the debt targeting
scheme is needed to attain the second-best allocation; on the other hand, under the “no -




We have shown in subsection 3.1 that we can achieve the second-best allocation by a
performance contract for each of the integrated agency and the independent central bank.  The
results of subsection 3.2 also imply that the performance contracts we have considered in
subsection 3.1 could be interpreted either as the debt and inflation target for the integrated agency
or the inflation target for the independent bank.  In this subsection, we argue that the inflation
target for the independent central bank is the most attractive among those four institutional
frameworks which achieve the second-best allocation.  We first point out that the targeting
schemes are more attractive than the performance contracts.  We then investigate the pros and
cons of the debt and inflation target for the integrated agency versus the inflation target for the
independent bank.
We begin by arguing that the targeting schemes are practically easier to be implemented than
the performance contracts because our performance contract schemes require that the contract
transfer payments must be completely financed by lump-sum taxes.  Since it is practically
impossible to impose lump-sum taxes, the Congress must actually have distortionary taxes for
financing the contract transfer payments.  This tax requirement may prevent the integrated agency
or the central bank from attaining the second-best allocation.  In contrast, none of our targeting
schemes make it necessary for the Congress to consider the financing requirements.  Our analysis
thus suggests that the targeting scheme has another financial advantage over the performance
contract scheme in addition to the practical and political difficulties mentioned in the previous
literature (see McCallum [1995] and King [1997]).
We next discuss that the  inflation target by the central bank under the “ on-coordination
without commitment” is more practically attractive than the inflation and debt target by the
“integrated agency without commitment”.   First, the integrated agency must implement both the
inflation and debt targets simultaneously. Thus, it has difficulty obtaining the credibility of its policy
from the general public because these two targets are mutually interacted, and because historical
experiences indicate that the debt target is subject to various political pressures.  Second, in order
to attain the second-best resource allocation by the debt target rule (71), we need to find someone
who feels losses from the excessive amount of debt in comparison with the first-best level of debt.
In contrast, our instrument-independent central bank, which is separated from the government
financing requirement, only announces a numerical inflation target and needs to be accountable
only for the realized rate of inflation.  Therefore, it is more likely that such a transparent and
simple framework of policy making is socially desirable.
Some readers might wonder whether such an inflation target can ever be successful if the central
bank takes the decision of the fiscal authority as given because in our model the debt level affects
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the rate of inflation in equilibrium.  Indeed, Sargent and Wallace [1981] clearly indicates that the
central bank is likely to lose the credibility of the monetary control and the inflation target if the
central bank must use an inflation tax to accommodate fiscal expenditures.  However, in our
setting, while the instrument independent central bank takes the public debt accumulation as given,
the fiscal authority also takes the rate of inflation as given.  The fiscal authority thus knows that it
cannot spend public expenditures as much as it wants in the second period. In this way, our
instrument-independent central bank can successfully constrain the fiscal authority and can even
eliminate the inflation bias.  To make this arrangement more plausible, our institutional regime
requires that the inflation target must be known to the Congress in advance; and that the
transparency of monetary policy does matter not only for the sake of controlling for inflation but
also constraining excessive fiscal expenditures.  The model here generalizes the idea of classic
public choice theory (see Buchanan and Wagner [1981] for example) in the context of the optimal
contract literature and the studies on the optimal institutional design of a central bank.
We have not so far examined an optimal contract or targeting for the fiscal agency under the
“non-coordination without commitment”.  To conclude this section, we discuss whether or not
the second-best allocation is attained by a performance contract or a targeting rule offered from the
Congress to the government.
















NtNt dzdzhzhzfzfzzz ++++++=  denote a contract transfer
payment from the government budget to the government itself under th  “non-coordination
without commitment”.  We assume that the performance contract for the government must be
completely financed by the lump-sum tax, FNtt . 　Since the government can choose only tf , th ,
and td  under the “non-coordination without commitment”, this kind of contract is the most
comprehensive one in the class of quadratic performance contracts for the government in our
model.
  In fact, we can show that none of the quadratic performance contracts for the government can
achieve the second-best allocation under the “ on-coordination without commitment”.  Similarly,
none of the targeting schemes for the government can attain the second-best allocation.  This
finding suggests that the nominal debt target, as is commonly observed in the EU countries, Japan,
and the United States, is not sufficient enough to lead the economy to the optimal allocation of
resources within the class of model considered here if such countries have a positive amount of
debt and take the central bank as an instrument-independent one.  Even though the fiscal authority
is well disciplined by a quadratic performance contract or a targeting scheme, it cannot be a




  The results obtained here show that in order to deal with the problem of dynamic inconsistency
in monetary and fiscal policies practically, we must ask for an instrument-independent central bank
which controls for money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to some
numerical inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.  One might wonder if the best solution
could be a strong integrated agency that dictates both fiscal and monetary policies as we have seen
under the “integrated agency without commitment”.  However, it is practically difficult for the
policy makers to find someone who feels losses from the excessive amount of debt, and to
implement an inflation target and a public debt target simultaneously.  Furthermore, throughout
the history of monetary economies, inflation generally happens because of the excessive
government spending together with the lending of the central bank to the government which makes
the spending possible.  It therefore becomes the wisdom of the democratic society to separate the
fiscal agency and the central bank as we have supposed under the “non-coo dination without
commitment”.  Nonetheless, since the central bank is given the power to issue fiat money, it must
not misuse such a privilege and must be committed to some numerical targets to explain the
behavior for the general public.  This idea has been proposed by Simons [1936] after the collapse
of the international gold standard system that effectively constrains the excessive issue of fiat
money.  These considerations suggest that the instrument-independent and inflation-target
conservative central bank which is free from the governmental financial constraint is one of the
most attractive institutional designs, as we have seen under the “non-coordination without
commitment”.
There are some issues that we do not analyze in this paper.  First, as McCallum [1995]
criticized, we do not explicitly consider why the policy makers cannot credibly be committed to
their optimal policies.  Second, we do not specify the political process for explaining how our
fiscal or monetary authority is appointed.  Nevertheless, we believe that our model should be a
useful first step to discuss the implications of performance contract and targeting schemes based on
some observable policy variables in the presence of strategic interaction between a fiscal authority
and a central bank.
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Appendix A
We prove that the second-best allocation can be achieved by the performance contract








2ˆIw ) under the “integrated agency without commitment” and by the performance
contract (p 1ˆNw ,
p
2ˆNw ) under the “non-coordination without commitment”.
Under the “integrated agency without commitment”, we solve the minimization problems (54)











defined by (58)-(61), and obtain the first-order conditions evaluated under the rational expectations
equilibrium ( t
e


























dK r++  = -
n
2f  + k 2p - 2h ,
(A 4)
where CI 2l  is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with (21).  Similarly, the first-order

























































































































p + CI1l  = 0,
101 )1(
~
ddK -++ r  = -
n
1f + k 1p  – 1h ,
(A 9)
where CI1l  is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with (27); and (( 1
**





2 dhC ) denotes a solution to the minimization problem (54), which satisfies (A1)-(A4).  Note
that p 2ˆIw  depends on 1d  because )( 12 dGFR  is a function of 1d .












we can prove that these first-order conditions are equivalent to those for the minimization
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pp , we can show that any solution to
the minimization problem (6) ((12)) in the second-best case is replicated by a solution to the
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2ˆIw ) defined by (58)-(61) can then achieve
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Substituting (A2), (A3), and (A10) into (A4) and rearranging the resulting equation, we have

















where )( 12 dGFR  is defined by (21).  Inspecting (A11) with (58) and (A2) immediately yields
C
IIw 22ˆ l
p -= n2f= .
  Given CIIw 22ˆ l
p -= , we next substitute (58) into (A1)-(A3) and differentiate the resulting








































Note that ( )( 1
**
2 dCp , )( 1
**
2 dfC , )( 1
**
2 dhC ) is a solution to the minimization problem (54), which
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2 dCp  with (58), (60), (61), (A10), (A12), and 
C
IIw 22ˆ l
p -=  leads us to show that









































The remaining problem is to verify that np 11ˆ fwI = .  Substituting (A12)-(A15) into (A8) and




































Now, it follows from (59) and (A6) that nlp 111ˆ fw
C
II =-= , which finally establishes that the first-
order conditions (A1)-(A9) are equivalent to those derived in the second-best case.
Under the “non-coordination without commitment”, w  solve the minimization problems (56)
and (57).  Then, applying the above procedure to the resulting first-order conditions with (62) and
(63), we can show that the performance contract defined by (62) and (63) can achieve the second-
best allocation.
Appendix B
Since the second-best allocation is attained by the optimal performance contract, it is also
achieved by the optimal targeting rule if the contracting problems (54) and (55) ((56) and (57)) for






II wwww ) ((
pp
21 ˆ,ˆ NN ww )) defined by (58)-(61) ((62) and
(63)) are reduced to the targeting problems (68) and (69) ((72) and (73)) and if the optimal
inflation target derived from the targeting problem (68) ((72)) is consistent with the optimal
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inflation target in period 2 derived from the targeting problem (69) ((73)).
Here, we only rewrite the contracting problem (55) for the optimal performance contract






II wwww ) as the targeting problem (69) because we can rewrite the other contracting
problems as the corresponding targeting problems by applying similar discussions.  Now, for the






II wwww ), the objective function of the contracting
problem (55) is modified by
2

















































)([ -- + 21
**




2 )]([ dha Cg }.         (B1)
Substituting (58) with (7) into the term p
p awI
2
2)ˆ(-  of (B1) and rearranging the right-hand side of
(B1), we have
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Ip  given by (B2), we see that the objective function of the contracting problem
(55) is exactly transformed into the objective function of the targeting problem (69) for the optimal










2 r+-= K .  Because the constraints of the
contracting problem (55) are the same as those of the targeting problem (69), this implies that the
contracting problem (55) is equivalent to the targeting problem (69) for the optimal performance










2 r+-= K .
  We next prove the relations represented by (71).  Substituting (60) and (61) into (B3), we
obtain



















2ˆIw ) achieves the second-best



















Substituting the relation CIIw 11ˆ l
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1. If the production function is given by h tt LY = , the representative firm maximizes the profits
ttttt LWLP -- )1( t
h  with respect to Lt, where Lt, Pt, and Wt denote the labor input, the price level,
and the nominal wage rate, respectively.  We assume that workers (unions) aim at a target real
wage rate, and that the logarithm of the real wage rate is normalized to zero.  Then, the logarithm
of the nominal wage rate in period t is set equal to the logarithm of the expected price level in
period t.  The logarithm of the output in period t is now represented by =ty
tphh )](1/([ - )loghtp +-- t
e
t .  The normalized output tx  in period t is then defined by
tt yx º hhh log)]1/([ -- ; and the constant n  is defined by )]1/([ hhn -º .  See Beetsma and
Bovenberg [1997] for details.
2. Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997] supposes that tx
~ i e first-best output level.  However,
following the convention of the literature on inflation contracts and targeting, we assume that tx
~
corresponds to the second-best output level.
3. For the derivation procedure of the government financing requirement constraint (2), see
Beetsma and Bovenberg [1997], which proves that this constraint is a good approximation if the
output level realized without tax distortions or inflation surprises is not so different from the anti-
log of tx .
4. We assume that k X* = Mt/Pt, where X* is the level of output which is consistent with the natural
rate of unemployment, and M is nominal money supply.  This assumption can be understood
either as the Cambridge equation of quantity theory of money or as a cash in advance constraint.
If X* is constant, this assumption implies that the central bank can determine the rate of inflation by
controlling for the growth rate of money supply.  Although it is impossible to measure the level of
X* precisely, we can state that the empirical counterpart of k  is the inverse of the velocity of money.
The inverse of the velocity of money can be different from one and slowly changing over time
mainly due to the effect of financial sophistication as Bordo and Joung [1988] has shown.  The
series of American data for the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP have a range of 0.161 to 0.188, and
those for the ratio of currency to nominal consumption have a range of 0.064 to 0.078 during the
period of 1988-1995.  The corresponding series of Japanese data have a range of 0.278 to 0.357
and 0.140 to 0.160, respectively.  For these data, see The Bank of Japan [1996].  Since the
government financing requirement constraint (2) assumes that the government can impose the
inflation tax on monetary assets in this model, it is plausible to consider the monetary assets as
either M1 or Cash.  Hence, the plausible value of k  is at most 0.19 for the United States and 0.36
35
for Japan, which are strictly less than one.
5. For the goal- and instrument-independent central bank, see Debelle and Fischer [1994].
6. Since tx
~ measures the deviation from the first-best output level that is caused by the non-tax
distortions, it can be interpreted as an implicit tax on output. Furthermore, it follows from (1) that
the output subsidy n/~tx-  can raise output towards the second-best output level tx
~.  Thus,
n/~tx-  can be taken as implicit tax revenues.
7. Since (21) is always binding with equality, 2Il  is almost always positive.
8. Since (27) is always binding with equality, 1Il  is almost always positive.
9. In this case, the contract transfer payment to the integrated agency can be divided between the
government and the central bank in accordance with their internal arrangements.  The government
may hold several administrative positions in the central bank instead of receiving a part of the
contract transfer payment.
10. This remark also holds true in the other previous studies of the inflation contract and targeting
rule.
11. The constraint (29) is evaluated by )( 1
*
2 dp = )( 1
**
2 dCp .
12. The constraint (51) is evaluated by )( 1
***
2 dp = )( 1
**
2 dCp .
13. The minimization problem (42) is evaluated by ()( 1
**p )( 1
***
2 df , )( 1
***





2 dfC , )( 1
***
2 dhC ).
14. Although we do not assume k = 1, this parametric case needs some comment.  If k = 1, the
allocation of the economy happens to coincide with the second-best allocation even though neither
the government nor the central bank coordinates their policy decisions or commits themselves to
their policy announcements.  Thus, we need not to design any performance contracts if k = 1.
15. See note 1.
16. The constraint (29) is evaluated by )( 1
**
2 dp = )( 1
**
2 dTp .
17. The constraint (51) is evaluated by )( 1
***
2 dp = )( 1
***
2 dTp .
18. See notes 7 and 8.
19. Since (35) and (43) are always binding with equality, 1Nl  and 2Nl  are almost always positive.
36
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